Renergy™ Conversion Series · Research 06

Why More Customers Don't Always Create More Value

Customer Growth Without Contribution

Published November 3, 2026 · Last updated November 3, 2026

UPS deliberately gave up package volume from its largest customer.

Its 2025 Form 10-K describes a plan to reduce Amazon volume by more than 50% by June 2026 relative to 2024. Amazon and affiliates accounted for 10.6% of 2025 revenue. Average daily package volume declined 7.0%, while revenue per piece rose 6.6%. UPS's operating profit also fell in 2025, so this shows a deliberate choice, not yet a result.

What exactly does the next customer cause the company to do?

A large account may bring attractive revenue alongside unusual inventory, engineering changes or special delivery. Another customer may pay a premium for genuinely demanding service. A third may look difficult because the company makes ordinary work unnecessarily complicated. These are different management decisions.

Not every dollar of revenue deserves the same operating capacity.

Four public-company disclosures illustrate customer selection, alternative delivery arrangements, historical costs from customer-directed changes, and customization that can command higher margins. None establishes a company-specific amount of Structural Drag.

The purpose is to distinguish what the customer requires, what the customer pays for, and what the company's arrangement makes people do to deliver it.

1. The Customer-Arrangement Map

Customer profitability analysis is well established. Pricing, margin and cost-to-serve matter, but those measures may stop one question too early.

Two companies may fulfill the same promise at the same price while using different amounts of paid effort. Scale, geography, skill and capacity may explain the difference; so may the arrangement of work.

In my Business Structural Drag framework, Structural Drag is work a company repeats because of how it is arranged—work a different arrangement could remove without changing what the customer receives or what the business must protect.

The analysis must therefore separate the commercial proposition from the operating design.

Figure 1 / Research 06

The Customer-Arrangement Map

01. The promise

What exactly are we committed to provide, for what price and under which conditions?

Evidence: contract terms, product mix, special handling, response time, service level, scope and change rights

02. The work

What actually happens each time this customer is served?

Evidence: sampled orders, engineering changes, picks, deliveries, approvals, returns, escalations, corrections and waiting

03. The economics

What contribution arrives after the resources necessary to fulfill the promise?

Evidence: incremental revenue, direct costs, customer-specific service costs, capacity consumption, working capital and cash

04. The arrangement

Could the same obligation be fulfilled with less repeated work—or is the work necessary and appropriately priced?

Evidence: competing service routes, first-pass acceptance, actual alternatives, controlled comparisons and costs of changing
Figure 1. Customer contribution is an economic result. Arrangement-created repetition is a possible operating explanation, not a conclusion that follows from low margin.

An expensive customer may require expensive service, pay too little for it, or trigger work that a different arrangement could avoid.

The customer is not the diagnosis. The arrangement is the hypothesis.

Consider a fictional industrial distributor promising a contractor next-morning parts while accepting late changes. Sales, purchasing, warehouse and dispatch use different release schedules, so staff repeatedly repick and expedite the same orders. The customer may legitimately need late changes and be willing to pay for them. But management should test whether the repeated work is necessary or whether compatible release rules would preserve the promise at lower cost. Repricing and redesign might both be warranted. This is an illustration, not a reported engagement.

2. The four signatures of arrangement-created work

The distinctive Structural Drag question starts with the difference between work necessary to keep a promise and work repeated because of the company's arrangement. Four signatures matter:

A PROMISE THAT CHANGES AFTER WORK BEGINS Sales, pricing, engineering or scheduling commits to terms that operations must repeatedly clarify. The customer may have asked for a valid modification; the issue is why the company's own release system cannot carry that change cleanly.
A HANDOFF THAT RETURNS INSTEAD OF ADVANCING Customer requirements arrive at purchasing, production, dispatch or service missing data or authority needed to act. Staff correct and re-enter the same work more than once.
AN EXCEPTION THAT HAS BECOME A ROUTINE A special requirement was agreed once, but now every order invokes the same manual approval, spreadsheet reconciliation, manager intervention or workaround. The customer needs the result—not necessarily the workaround.
A COMMITMENT MADE BEFORE READINESS Inventory, people or delivery capacity are reserved before a customer's specifications, site conditions or demand pattern are confirmed. Some reserves are prudent; others produce recurring reshuffles and expediting.

These signatures suggest structural hypotheses, not diagnoses. The six profiles are illustrated in Research 01.

The customer may have requested the exception. The company may have created the repetition.

Premium service may deserve premium pricing. Internal repetition may deserve redesign. Neither conclusion follows from gross margin alone.

3. Four explanations before calling a customer unprofitable

The same low contribution can have different causes. Test competing explanations before changing prices, refusing an account or redesigning work.

Figure 2 / Research 06

Four Competing Explanations

01

The economics of the promise are inadequate

Price or contract terms do not cover legitimate service, scope, risk or capital requirements.

Reprice, clarify the scope, change the service level or revise commercial terms
02

The service is valuable but resource-intensive

Customization, responsiveness, quality or differentiation genuinely requires extra capability.

Verify willingness to pay and contribution after necessary costs; protect the capability if justified
03

The operating arrangement repeats work

Ordinary or premium service triggers preventable re-entry, correction, reconciliation, rescheduling or escalation.

Trace real transactions and test whether a different arrangement preserves the promise with less effort
04

Timing or strategy changes the apparent return

A new customer is in ramp-up, an account opens a valuable channel, demand is cyclical, or common costs distort attribution.

Set the investment horizon, distinguish incremental from allocated cost and test the alternative explanation
Figure 2. More than one explanation may be true. A customer can be poorly priced and also cause avoidable repeated work. The remedy should match the cause.

An allocated fixed cost may not disappear when an account leaves. Conversely, a customer may cover direct costs while consuming scarce capacity needed for better orders. Test incremental economics rather than declaring either case proven from allocations.

4. Four public-company situations

These are four documented situations, not Structural Drag diagnoses. The structural questions are mine.

Public-company evidence · Global logistics · 2025 Form 10-K

UPS — Choosing which volume to carry

UPS planned to reduce Amazon volume more than 50% by June 2026 relative to 2024; Amazon and affiliates represented 10.6% of 2025 revenue. UPS pursued other revenue-quality actions as well.

In 2025, average daily package volume fell 7.0%, while revenue per piece rose 6.6%, reflecting mix, pricing and other factors alongside network changes.

The financial qualification: Consolidated operating profit declined $601 million and margin fell 40 basis points in 2025. This strategy is not yet proof of improved company-wide profitability; the filing does not provide Amazon's stand-alone contribution.

My structural question

Which packages, customers, routes and service promises require materially different network capacity? Where can the operating route change with the customer mix—and where will the company still retain fixed costs, delivery obligations or capacity that cannot disappear immediately?

I would trace comparable package categories through price, sort, delivery and capacity—without assigning the profit decline to a customer on this evidence.

What UPS establishes: A major company deliberately chose to reshape the volume it serves while pursuing higher revenue quality. Choosing revenue is an operating and capital decision, not proof of final profit conversion.

Read the original filing and evidence notes
Public-company evidence · Beverage manufacturing and distribution · 2025 Form 10-K

Coca-Cola Consolidated — Changing the delivery arrangement, not necessarily the customer

Coca-Cola Consolidated primarily uses its own delivery network, but also reports moving certain products and customer channels to alternative routes to market, including third parties and customer supply-chain networks. It cites profitability and service objectives.

The clearest reported example concerns post-mix fountain beverages—syrup dispensed through fountain machines at restaurants and other venues. In 2025, about two-thirds of its post-mix gallons were delivered by alternative routes. Less than 10% of bottle-and-can volume used such routes. The company also describes different fees and accounting treatment associated with these arrangements.

The company can preserve the commercial relationship while changing who physically delivers the product.

My structural question

What happens to the full economics of an order when delivery moves from an owned truck and warehouse to another channel? Which expense disappears, which fees or obligations remain, what happens to customer service, and which new coordination is required?

Outsourcing is not automatically more efficient; compare service and incremental costs across routes.

What Coca-Cola Consolidated establishes: A real company altered the route by which selected customer requirements are fulfilled, rather than treating the product and customer relationship as an unchangeable delivery design. Its filing does not isolate the net profit improvement attributable to that route change.

Read the original filing and evidence notes
Public-company evidence · Electronics manufacturing services · 2025 Form 10-K

Celestica — Customer-directed changes have created operating costs

Celestica's 2025 Form 10-K, Item 1A, Risk Factors, describes customer-requested factory transfers and their historical consequences.

Under the heading “Transfers of business or operations have increased and may again increase our costs…”, Celestica states that customers have required manufacturing programs to move between its facilities to pursue cost reductions, tariff savings and other objectives. The company says those transfers “have resulted in and could again result in increased costs”, citing downtime, suboptimal manufacturing-capacity utilization and transition delays or complications.

The historical costs are real, but the filing names no specific transfer, customer or dollar amount. Transfers may have been rational despite disruption.

My structural question

What work appears each time a customer requires a manufacturing transfer? What is inherently necessary—qualification, tooling, documentation, quality assurance, training—and what is repeated because the sending and receiving operations use incompatible data, release rules, readiness definitions or decision rights?

I would sample prior transfers across engineering data, materials, validation, customer approvals and first-pass production, separating required qualification from potentially avoidable repeated work.

What Celestica establishes: Customer-directed changes have historically produced additional operating costs. The filing supports investigating the mechanism; it does not support attributing any particular amount to Structural Drag.

Read the original filing and evidence notes
Public-company evidence · Building-products manufacturing and distribution · 2025 Form 10-K

Builders FirstSource — The right complexity may command more margin

Builders FirstSource's 2025 Form 10-K describes gross-margin differences driven by volume, mix, cost to serve, project pricing and upgrades. Large production homebuilders generally carry lower gross margins than some other markets.

The company also states that more highly engineered and customized products typically earn higher gross margins than commodity lumber and sheet goods. It points to structural components, millwork, doors and windows as areas where customization and operational capabilities can support differentiation.

These gross-margin patterns are not a fully costed customer-contribution analysis. They show why customization cannot automatically be labeled waste.

My structural question

Which customer variations create value that buyers will pay for, and which internal variations exist only because the company's order, design, production and installation systems cannot agree on a standard? Does customization increase price and economic contribution sufficiently to pay for the work it requires?

I would compare similar orders through engineering readiness, changes, delivery exceptions, acceptance, contribution and cash—without treating required specifications as unnecessary work.

What Builders FirstSource establishes: Margin differs with customer mix and product characteristics, and a more engineered or customized offering can command more gross margin. The filing does not establish which customers yield the highest fully costed contribution.

Read the original filing and evidence notes

5. What the four situations establish

UPS shows revenue selection; Coca-Cola Consolidated shows a choice of delivery route; Celestica documents costs from customer-directed changes; Builders FirstSource shows why valuable customization must be protected. None is a measured Structural Drag case.

Before calling a customer good or bad, establish what the customer requires, what the company earns, and what the operating arrangement makes everyone do.

A demanding account may deserve a premium; a low-margin account may be easy to serve; an apparently difficult account may become attractive if repeated internal work is removed. Match the decision to the evidence.

6. The economics: contribution, capacity and cash

Customer-level financial analysis must be sufficiently detailed to identify different decisions, but not so elaborate that arbitrary allocations determine which accounts look profitable.

The Customer Arrangement Bridge follows:

Net customer revenue → direct product and service costs → customer-specific incremental operating costs → economically relevant capacity and capital requirements → contribution and cash.

Reconcile actual prices, discounts and returns; direct fulfillment expenses; and observed incremental costs such as special inventory, repeat picking, engineering changes, exception handling or rework.

Then test scarce capacity and capital requirements. Opportunity cost matters when a customer prevents higher-contribution work—but it is not a cash expense, and cannot be counted again as a realized saving.

Separate incremental costs from common-cost allocations. A warehouse lease may remain when a customer leaves, but a service pattern may trigger the next shift, building or supervisor. Volume and timing matter.

My three economic ledgers remain distinct: verified financial effects, paid capacity consumed, and contribution not earned. Do not add a potential opportunity to realized savings or count released hours twice.

Payment terms and customer inventory also affect cash (Research 03); changing a service route does not automatically raise throughput (Research 04).

The decision is whether to retain, reprice, serve differently or decline the work—on incremental economics and observed operations.

A margin report tells you what the account appears to earn. A work sample tells you what the company must do to earn it.

7. Give this to your CFO, COO and commercial leader

The Customer Arrangement Test

Do not begin with a ranking of the ten least profitable customers. Begin with one consequential account or customer type whose revenue, growth, service complexity or operating demands could change the next capital or hiring decision.

1. What did we actually promise? Recover pricing, scope, volume, customization, delivery, service levels, returns, payment terms and exceptional rights. Identify what was priced, what was implied and what was accepted informally after the original agreement.

2. What work does that customer actually trigger? Sample completed orders or service events, not an org chart. Trace each through quotation, engineering, release, purchasing, production, delivery, acceptance, invoicing and correction. Measure first-pass acceptance and recurring exceptions.

3. Which requirements are necessary, valuable and paid for? Separate customer-requested differentiation, safety and quality obligations, deliberate reserves and true operating requirements from internal re-entry, repeat approvals, rescheduling and reconciliation. Test at least one plausible competing explanation.

4. Where is the work being repeated—and why? Locate the precise handoff, decision rule, data mismatch or commitment that generates repeat effort. Compare similar transactions and ask what evidence would disprove the suspected structural cause.

5. Could the same promise be fulfilled another way? Compare an alternative route, release standard, schedule, service tier, customer agreement or operating boundary. Preserve customer acceptance, product quality and required controls. Include transition costs and any new risks the alternative creates.

6. What are the verified economics? Reconcile revenue with direct and customer-specific costs, relevant capacity, incremental capital and working capital. Keep realized savings, paid time and contribution opportunities separate. Show which results were measured and which remain hypotheses.

7. What is the decision? Choose whether to expand the relationship, change the commercial terms, redesign the way the promise is fulfilled, limit or exit particular work—or deliberately change nothing. Specify the evidence, owner, measure and review date for the decision.

The test does not require that every demanding customer be retained, repriced or exited. It may conclude the customer is valuable, the service is correctly priced, and the apparent inefficiency is a necessary operating obligation. It may conclude that the customer should pay more. Or it may find that redesigning the company's own arrangement changes the economics while preserving the relationship.

The objective is not to prove that a difficult customer is unprofitable. It is to distinguish what the customer needs from what the company makes unnecessarily difficult.

8. What would change my conclusion?

I would weaken a Structural Drag hypothesis if sampled transactions show that the extra work is required by the customer's specification, legitimate compliance, quality, geography, actual demand variability or a carefully priced service promise—and that the current method performs it efficiently.

An allocated fixed cost that would remain, a profitable adjacent product mix, or deliberate ramp-up spending could also explain apparent poor contribution.

I would strengthen the case for structural examination if the same ordinary requests repeatedly cross functions incomplete, if one customer-specific exception is re-approved on every transaction, if different teams maintain conflicting records of a single promise, or if rerouting equivalent work reduces corrections while preserving quality and service.

A redesign that shifts the same effort to a supplier or customer, compromises service, or counts released hours twice has not established recoverable value.

9. Before winning the next big account

A major new account may be exactly what the company needs. Before the next $10 million in revenue arrives, management should know whether that work will enter a functioning operating path or create recurring exceptions.

The right response may be better pricing, a different route, a narrower promise, more capacity—or less repeated work.

Not every dollar of revenue deserves the same operating capacity.

Decide what work to accept, how to price it and how to fulfill it.

Research 01 examined growth without operating leverage. Research 02 examined technology investment. Research 03 examined cash conversion. Research 04 examined usable capacity and delivered output. Research 05 examined acquisition value. Research 06 asks whether the customer relationship and the way it is served create economic contribution.

Gower Idrees

Creator of the Business Structural Drag framework and the Renergy™ management framework

Sources, Evidence Notes & Research Methodology

Primary company documents reviewed through November 3, 2026. Public figures relate to the reporting periods specified; they do not imply that events or conditions continued unchanged after those periods.

A. United Parcel Service (UPS)

A1 — 2025 Form 10-K, Item 1 “Customers” and Item 7 “Management's Discussion and Analysis,” printed pages 6–7 and 23–24; U.S. Domestic Package discussion, printed pages 30–32

Read the original SEC filing

The company reports Amazon and affiliates at 10.6% of 2025 consolidated revenue; a planned reduction in that customer's volume of more than 50% by June 2026 relative to 2024; global average daily package volume of 20.847 million versus 22.418 million, a 7.0% decline; consolidated average revenue per piece of $14.50 versus $13.60, a 6.6% rise; GAAP operating profit of $7.867 billion versus $8.468 billion; and operating margin of 8.9% versus 9.3%. The volume and revenue-per-piece figures concern global small-package operations and reflect a mix of changes, not Amazon traffic alone. The document separately reports network restructuring, cost savings, operational pressures and segment-level effects.

Evidence boundary: The filing supports a decision to reduce certain volume, not a calculation of Amazon customer profitability, the final effect of the reduction plan, or improvement in GAAP consolidated operating results. The company's network cost savings cannot be attributed exclusively to one customer decision.

B. Coca-Cola Consolidated

B1 — 2025 Form 10-K, Item 7 “Areas of Emphasis — Optimal Route to Market,” printed page 25; revenue-recognition description for post-mix products

Read the original SEC filing

The company describes shifting selected fountain-syrup and bottle-and-can delivery away from its conventional direct-store-delivery routes to alternative distribution arrangements, including third parties and customer supply-chain networks. It states approximately two-thirds of 2025 post-mix gallon volume and less than 10% of bottle-and-can volume were delivered through alternative routes. It identifies commercial fees and different income-statement classifications for some arrangements. Post-mix refers to beverage syrup combined with water by dispensing equipment to produce fountain beverages.

Evidence boundary: This is reported operating behavior, not a quantified incremental savings estimate from the change. The two-thirds measure concerns post-mix gallons, not company-wide beverage volume or revenue; bottle/can volume and the fee amounts are recorded on different bases.

C. Celestica

C1 — 2025 Form 10-K, Item 1A, “Transfers of business or operations have increased and may again increase our costs and cause disruptions in our ability to service our customers,” printed page 26

Read the original SEC filing

Note on wording: The filing says customers have previously required factory-to-factory transfers, and that these transfers caused increased costs in the past, including downtime, lower utilization, and transition delays or complications. The words describing past experience are explicit; later risks are also described.

The section is a risk factor; it does not identify a specific recent transfer, customer, monetary amount, avoidable portion or a causally established internal Structural Drag mechanism. It would be inaccurate to describe the paragraph as proof of a specific 2025 disruption.

D. Builders FirstSource

D1 — 2025 Form 10-K, Item 1A, “Changes in our customer or product sales mix affect our operating results,” printed pages 15–16

Read the original SEC filing

The company states that gross margins vary with customer volume, product mix, cost to serve, project characteristics and upgrades. It reports that sales to large single-family production homebuilders tend to earn lower gross margins than sales to other customer segments, while engineered and customized products typically earn higher gross margins. Those are company-described margin patterns, not a published customer-by-customer contribution analysis.

Evidence boundary: Higher gross margin does not prove higher fully costed contribution after customer-specific fulfillment, engineering, installation, service and capital costs. Nor does a general risk-factor description prove a particular 2025 customer caused profit deterioration.

E. Research methodology and analytical limits

This paper compares four publicly documented customer and operating situations. It is not a statistical study, customer-level profitability audit, industry estimate or internal assessment of the companies named.

Company-reported facts include documented customer-volume decisions, reported distribution arrangements, historical transfer-cost disclosures and stated margin tendencies. My interpretations are the Customer-Arrangement Map, the four competing explanations, structural work signatures, economic bridge and Customer Arrangement Test. Unresolved evidence includes customer-level realized contribution, transaction-level repeat work, incremental and avoidable costs, opportunity costs, demand, competing service-route economics and the viability of operating alternatives.

No public company is assigned a Structural Drag profile. A demanding customer, gross-margin difference, reduced package volume, third-party distribution model or manufacturing transfer is not itself Structural Drag. An arrangement-created component requires company-specific observation and a feasible alternative that preserves customer value, safety, service, contractual obligations and other legitimate protections.

Figures from different companies cannot be aggregated into a dollar estimate of Structural Drag or a customer value league table. Paid capacity consumed, verified financial effects and contribution not earned are separate measures and must not be double counted. The fictional distributor scenario is pedagogical, not a real company engagement.